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Abstract
This thesis analyzes the Israeli-Palestinian water issue using a settler colonial framework. It
highlights the contributions made to this field under the often used framework of
hydro-hegemony to understand water issues in Israel-Palestine. Using a settler colonial
framework helps to better describe the issue and highlight the slow creep of settler colonialism
over the years. It also helps to see beyond the power dynamics and its relationship to domination
and consent to understand the realities that Palestinians face on the ground. In addition, this
thesis will help build towards exploring resistance to water control under settler colonialism.
Therefore, this thesis uses the village of Bardala, located in the northern part of the Jordan
Valley, as a case study to examine Israel’s control over water resources, and the restrictions it
has placed on accessing water for Palestinians. Through interviews and secondary sources, this
thesis shows how settler colonial policies disrupt the entire fabric of Palestinian society. These
policies consolidated Israel’s control over the water resources through various tools such as the
permit regime which was established under the Oslo Interim Agreement of 1995, prevention of
developing and constructing water infrastructures, attacks on water facilities and confiscation of
agricultural equipment. In return, Palestinians have been engaging in various forms of everyday
resistance methods to remain steadfast and continue to exist in the face of occupation. Therefore,
using a settler colonial framework shows how the control over water resources is part of a
greater settler colonial framework aimed at accessing territory and eliminating Palestinians from
their lands through various processes and structures.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Since the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians have been
suffering from severe water shortages due to Israel's control over water resources and water
management. Since then Palestinians have been deprived from their right to access their natural
resources. A major factor that contributes to this conflict is Israel’s ever growing illegal
settlement project and its settler colonial policies of dispossessing Palestinians from their lands.
This has been an ongoing struggle of the Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley who are
restricted from accessing their water resources. Water control in Israel-Palestine is not a new
subject, and extensive research has been conducted on this topic. Most people study this issue
using the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, a power-dynamic framework used to explain
hegemony at the river basin which is achieved through consolidated control over water resources
through various strategies and tactics. Though this is helpful, and illuminates many of the power
dimensions at play in Israeli-Palestine water relations, it may not give a full picture of these
dynamics. Moreover, other ways that people look at this conflict is not simply through
power-dynamics, but as a settler colonial project. This thesis attempts to show what is gained
from using a settler colonial framework to understand water conflict in this basin.
The aim of this research is to go beyond hydro-hegemony’s focus on power and its
relationship to domination and consent. It looks at how water control under settler colonialism
has operated and changed over time. Adopting a settler colonialism framework, which is viewing
Israeli actions around water control not just as domination, but as a step in the direction of
eviction and erasure, opens up new ways of interpreting water conflicts in Palestine. With a
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clearer understanding, this would help others to then organize around that understanding of what
is happening on the ground.
It also helps to better understand forms of Palestinian resistance to the ever growing
control over water. Importantly this framework can be helpful in answering the following
research questions; What is gained from thinking about this issue- not simply as power play
between peoples who share the same water resource, but as part of a broader settler colonial
project?; How can natural resources under settler colonialism - in this case water and land - can
be used as tools to dispossess and enact eviction and erasure measures?
Specifically, I explore water control in the Palestinian village of Bardala, in the Jordan
Valley using a settler cololonial framework. I seek to understand how Israeli settler colonial
policies have used water as a tool to consolidate their control over the water resources in Bardala
and restrict the community from accessing their equitable share of water. Unlike other scarce
resources, water is the main source of fueling all aspects of society. Yet today, water in Palestine
has not only been commodified, but is also being used as a weapon to threaten peoples’
livelihoods. The slow creep of Israel’s settler colonial policies and the tools to control the water
resources in the Jordan Valley are related to controlling Palestinian lands and restricting
Palestinian development, with a greater aim of dispossession and annexation. Despite these
conditions, Palestinians in Bardala have been engaging in everyday forms of resistance to not
only show resilience and steadfastness, but to also survive as a group and counter the settler
colonial notion of eliminating the native.
Considering the acute water problems that Palestinians face, the issue continues to be
neglected in political discourse. The importance of water impacts every aspect of society,
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whether that is health, agriculture, economy, sanitation, and to some, even dignity. In a region
where water is a scarce resource, it has received little to no attention oftentimes. Although water
may not be the “sole motive for war,” in many cases it has been a result and a victim of wars and
a weapon of control.
Israel laid control over the main water resources that are located in the West Bank in
1967 following the Six Day war when it occupied the West Bank, Golan Height, Sinai, and
Gaza. Hence, since 1967 Palestinian populations living in the West Bank, Gaza and East
Jerusalem have been struggling to access and have control over their water resources. During the
1993 Oslo Accords peace process, the first phase of Oslo did not set the rights of water, this was
done in the second round, Oslo Accords II in 1995. The Oslo II, an interim-agreement signed in
1995 by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the issue of water was set to be
discussed in the final status negotiations in 2000. The Oslo Accords II set the provisions by
which water should be managed by both parties and it established the Joint Water Committee to
oversee the management of water supply. The Interim Agreement also stipulated the allocation
of 80% of the water resource, Mountain Aquifer in the West Bank, to Israel, with the remaining
9

20% to the Palestinians as seen in Figure 1 below.

(Trottier, 2007: 118)
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Figure 1: “Israel's Water Wars” OCHA Infographic
It is important to note that the main source of water in the West Bank is derived from the
Mountain Aquifer. The water resources are all shared with Israel and other neighboring
countries. There are surface waters such as the Jordan River and Wadi Gaza in addition to
groundwater resources, such as aquifers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The final agreement
over water, however, was not solved because it was set to be discussed in the permanent status
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agreement. In addition, the cooperative agreements were established based on an asymmetrical
power relations which gave Israel the upper hand. Yet for the past 25 years there has not been
any negotiations between both parties and the issue of water, among the many other issues
continues to be neglected in the political discourse. More importantly, these agreements have
further consolidated Israel’s control over the water resources.
Even though this paper will not extensively address the legality aspect of the issue but it
is important to note that water under customary international law is a fundamental principle that
ensures the equitable and reasonable utilization and allocation of water. The right to water was
also identified in the Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers of 1966. In
addition, in the General Comment No. 15 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights it states,
Water is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and health. The
human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a
10

prerequisite for the realization of other human rights…. .
The right to water under Comment No. 15 is defined as follows: “Right of everyone to sufficient,
safe, acceptable and physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”
Therefore, water is a right and not a commodity and Palestinians today continue to be deprived
of their most basic human right. This also contributes to water insecurity as Palestines consume
between 30 to 100 liters for domestic use per person, while the Israeli per capita consumption is
approximately between 240 and 300 liters daily. This means Palestinians consume the minimum
liters required by the World Health Organization.

10
11

11

U.N.ECOSOC, 29th Sess, Agenda item 3. U.N Doc E/C.12/2002/11, OHCHR.
Zeitoun (2008) p. 14
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Given this brief contextual background in this study seeks to show that while
hydro-hegemony highlights the power dimensions, settler colonialism moves to include
longevity and the process with a particular end goal. Following my visit to Bardala, I was able to
engage in various conversations with the residents of the community and understand the impact
of Israeli water control on their livelihood as well as the modes of resistance that they engage in.
I will be addressing the historical context of this issue to show the initial stages of the slow creep
of settler colonialism and how it has evolved over the years in the Jordan Valley and specifically
in Baradala, with regards to water control. To provide an in-depth understanding of this issue, I
acknowledge the importance of providing a conceptual understanding of hydro-hegemony and
settler colonialism in addressing water issues. Moreover, to establish a comprehensive analysis I
conducted interviews and participant observation during my fieldwork in Bardala, in addition to
analysis of secondary sources. Therefore, my research highlights the importance of using a
settler colonial framework to understand the realities Palestinians experience on the ground with
Israel’s ever growing control over water and the forms of resistance they practice to counter the
occupation.
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Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology
The primary goal of this research is to use a settler colonial framework to understand
water issues in Israel-Palestine and to help better understand forms of Palestinian resistance. To
be able to get a clearer understanding of how the struggle over access to water is experienced at
the local level, I conducted fieldwork, interviews and participant observations in Bardala, a
Palestinian village the northern part of the Jordan Valley. Another element of this research was
carried out by analyzing secondary sources. The fieldwork was conducted over two trips, July
2019 and December 2019. The thesis is divided into three sections, the literature review, which
provides a conceptual review of all the scholars who have studied hydro-hegemony, specifically
in relation to Israel-Palestine water issues, settler colonialism, and everyday forms of resistance,
a background section which provides a historical context on Israel’s policy in the Jordan Valley,
and lastly a case study on Bardala which includes data from my fieldwork in addition to analysis
from my reviewed literature. This method was intended to understand the Israeli-Palestinian
water issue not only from a top down approach of power dynamics but from the local
perspective.

Methods
To proceed with the research, I used a qualitative method to gather data. These
approaches were the following: semi-structured interviews while conducting field work in
Palestine; secondary sources, textual data obtained from official documents, news articles,
previous research papers, scholarly articles, and reports from non governmental organizations;
participant observation when I went to the village. In addition, the data collected was in English
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and Arabic, which I translated. The documentary research assisted in helping me ask particular
questions to the interviewees. Furthermore, I analyzed the data by relating it to concepts which
go hand in hand with this case.
The participants of the study were chosen through snowball sampling. I interviewed a
total of 11 people, three of my interviews were conducted over the phone and the rest were face
to face. Before going to the field site I reached out to a former acquaintance whom I knew was
from Bardala. I conducted a semi-structured interview with him and inquired about the water
situation in Bardala. This interview was helpful as it provided me with an initial understanding
of Bardala, the history they had with Israeli control over the water resources, and the current
situation. Specifically I inquired about how water control has changed over time and what
alternatives do the residents seek in accessing water. His detailed answers helped me raise more
questions and come across new information. After this interview he helped me set a time to go to
Bardala. His family were my contact person in the village. Knowing Arabic gave me an
advantage of familiarity with the residents of the village. All of my interviews with the residents
in Bardala were conducted in Arabic.
The interviews I conducted in Bardala were informal interviews and participant
observation where I spent two full days at the village over two trips, one in July 2019 and one in
December 2020. Upon my arrival to Bardala I was welcomed by the initial interviewees brother
who gave me a tour around the village and showed me where the water reservoirs are located, the
water networks that are connected to Bardala and the water networks that are connected to the
Israeli settlements nearby. From both of my trips I spent a total of 18 hours in Bardala.
Upon my second trip I was introduced to five residents from the village, five of whom are
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farmers. The following were my initial questions and after these questions it became an informal
conversation where everyone was contributing.
1. In cases where you are unable to afford buying water what other alternatives do
you have to access water?
2. Do you feel there is a decrease in distributing water in the winter versus the
summer?
3. Have you seen a decrease by the Israeli authorities in the amount of water
distributed to the Palestinians in this area?
4. Do you have any farms? How do you manage to distribute the water between
domestic and agricultural purposes?
5. What are some alternatives you seek to access water?
6. What are some everyday forms of resistance that you engage in to counter Israel’s
control over the water resources.

In addition, I interviewed one person from the Palestinian Hydrology Group, a
Palestinian NGO focusing on water and sanitation issues. I chose PHG because they monitor the
changes that take place with regards to access to water. Since my research has the element of
time as a factor of analysis this NGO fit my research question. Before going to my interview I
looked at the projects and research they had conducted whether in the Jordan Valley or other
places in the West Bank. This was helpful in starting the conversation. I had begun by stating
my research purpose and research question and from there he provided me with information
regarding the Israeli policies in the Jordan Valley, and ways that the Jordan Valley could be
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utilized for the benefit of the Palestinians. Following that meeting I interviewed a Palestinian
government official. One theme that emerged with both of these interviews is that they both
explained how water is being used as a tool to dispossess the Palestinians from their lands. This
helped me shape my argument and build towards that understanding. I also conducted an
interview with a Palestinian journalist from Jerusalem who had a clear understanding of the
water and agricultural situation in Bardala. My interviews with her helped me gain a better
understanding of certain elements that were not discussed by others. The Palestinian government
official helped explain to me the water issue from a policy perspective. In addition, I also
interviewed an expert on the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. My questions to him were
about the settlements in the Jordan Valley and how they have increased over time. This interview
helped me understand the history of the settlements in the Jordan Valley, specifically I learned
about the history of the settlement near my field site.
Moreover, a timeline was created to show the major events that took place in Bardala.
The data was compiled from the research in the following sections in addition to reading news
reports, specifically those released by the Palestinian NGO, the Applied Research Institute
Jerusalem.
One of my aims is to understand how throughout the years the control over water
resources has been impacting the Palestinian communities and how the local population are
experiencing change of local power because using a hydro-hegemony framework does not fully
explore that. Understanding how the structure of settler colonialism has been impacting the
livelihoods over the years is beneficial in providing a more robust analysis of the power
dynamics.

17

Field Site
The Jordan Valley is rich in abundant natural resources and natural water resources, and
most importantly it is a vital part of the future State of Palestine. The Jordan Valley has a great
potential for agricultural and industrial development which can contribute to boosting Palestine's
economy. Specifically, I have chosen Bardala, a village in the northern Jordan Valley (See
Figure 2 below), as my field site because it is a microcosm of the struggles Palestinians face with
accessing water. Residents of the village lost control of their wells in 1968 and the first illegal
Israeli settlement, Mehola, that was established in Jordan Valley is located a few kilometers
away from Bardala. Bardala is a farming village where the residents depend on agriculture for
their livelihood and they have and with the establishment of Mehola, it deprived the residents
from their right to equitable water.
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Figure 2: Location of Bardala12
In addition to the north of Bardala lies 1949 Armistice Agreement Line which is the
internationally recognized border between Israel and the occupied State of Palestine. This is
crucial because Israel uses this to justify its seizure of lands and declaring lands as “closed
military areas” on the basis of security reasons. Therefore, Bardala represents an example of how

12

The dotted line on the map is the 1949 Armistice Agreement Line.
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the ever growing settler colonial policies continue to use water as a tool to dispossess them from
their lands. These are efforts aimed at further annexing the land for settler use.
I will be building a historical understanding of the area but more specifically how control
over water resources and access to water in the Palestinian communties of the Jordan Valley has
changed over time. The importance of examining time is crucial because the effects of settler
colonialism are ongoing, they do not happen in a single event. Therefore understanding the slow
creep of Israel’s settlement enterprise as a structure can help better explain the power dynamics.
Dispossession does not necessarily occur through forceful displacement, but through the theft
and exploitation of the natural resources of the indigenous population and these are part of the
structure of settler colonialism. To further understand this, I will be presenting a historical
context of Bardala and the settlement of Mehola .

Limitations and Challenges:
While this thesis provides a contribution to the field of water politics , however it does
pose some other limitations such as gender bias, as all my interviewees were male except for one
female. I spent only two days a total of 18 hours at Bardala, while I did gain a comprehensive
understanding of the struggles they face in accessing water, spending a longer time there would
have given me a better insight into how they deal with water on a daily basis and not just overall.
In addition to how other groups of people, not necessarily farmers are experiencing water. Since
I do not drive yet, finding transportation was very challenging. Logistical issues such as the
distance and no public transportation to there was a factor that made it difficult to go to the
village multiple times. Other reasons that also contributed to that was due to Israeli military
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closure, which took place on the exact day that I had planned to go to the village and stormy
weather in the winter made it quite impossible to find transportation. With regards to
documenting the main events that occurred on the timeline I was unable to find events that
occurred for some of the years, this might mean that there were either no more demolitions,
confiscations of water infrastructure or agricultural equipment reported or there no more
infrastructure left to demolish. Nevertheless, for the past few years there have been records of
demolitions and this means that the residents of Bardala were rebuilding regardless of obtaining
permits for construction. However, including all the demolitions on the timeline was not
feasible.
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Chapter 3: Literature Review
There has been wide range of literature examining the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict
and these bodies of literature study the conflict using different conceptual frameworks. Yet most
of the literature tackles the issue from a top-down approach which analyses international law and
the human rights aspect to water. My conceptual framework stems from looking at settler
colonial framework to better understand the current hydropolitical conflict – and specifically
how water control and subsequent resistance to those changes evolve over time. Cooperative
agreements do not always secure the equitable access of water resources to both sides due to
their asymmetrical framework and their underpinning power relations and power structure.
Therefore, for this thesis, the literature review will focus on existing and widely used
literature such as hydro-hegemony, settler-colonialism, environmental colonialism and everyday
forms of resistance. Over the decades, various scholars have examined the Israeli and Palestinian
water conflict using the framework of hydro hegemony, yet once aspect that has not yet been
explored is resistance to the ever growing control over water resources. By using the term
13

sumud

w
 hich means steadfastness and resistance-- and often times used in relation to

resilience-- to the Israeli occupation, I apply this to the Palestinian resistance and steadfastness to
the growing control over water resources with an aim of building towards an understanding of
sumud i n the context of water.

Hydro-Hegemony, and Cooperative Agreements
13

Fields, Gary. “‘Sumud’-The Will to Resist.” UC Press Blog, July 18, 2019.
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This section will examine the framework of hydro-hegemony by looking at previous
works of literature. It aims to define hydro-hegemony and examine how it is used to explain
current transboundary water conflicts. It

is crucial to keep in mind that while the

hydro-hegemony framework is useful, it is ultimately insufficient to fully describe the
phenomenon of water control in Palestine. In addition, there has not been enough literature
exploring counter-hegemony or modes of resistance to water control.
Scholars such as Fredrick Frey (1993), Peter Gleick (1993) and Miriam Lowi (1993)
were the first to study control over water resources beyond water wars and instead examined it
14

from a power relations framework . This section will look at Freys (1993) work to provide an
understanding of the emergence of hydro-hegemony. Building off from the hegemonic stability
theory (HST), in the article “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over
International River Basins,” Fredrick Frey (1993) acknowledged the urgent need of “a predictive
theory of conflict and cooperation over transnational rivers.” This was due to the fact that he
viewed the drastic increase in economic development and population growth as future causes to
15

increase in demand for water . Several models and theories of power are reported in the
literature to address this issue, however Frey’s urgency for a more coherent theory is
successfully explored in the remainder of the sections in his article. Therefore, Frey (1993)
presents a power-analytic framework theory to showcase its applicability to transnational river
systems. He views this model as an effective tool to understand the root causes of violent
transnational river basins and to predict potential conflicts between riparians.

Filippo. 2016. “Reconceptualizing Hegemony: The Circle of Hydro-Hegemony.”
Water Policy 18 (2): 401–18.
15
Frederick W. Frey (1993) The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International
River Basins, Water International, 18:1, 54-68
14

Menga,
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Frey (1993) succeeded in revealing three factors that would be essential for this
predictive model which are as follows: “The importance of water to each actor, the relative
16

power primarily military of each actor and the respective riparian positions of the actors.” . He
also looks at the underlying motivational factors that influence the actors’ power relations at a
riparian position Furthermore, he acknowledges the emergence of new actors within the
transnational water politics, more importantly he emphasizes the emergence of actors at the local
level. One factor that he examines is the “instrumental use [of] water as a political weapon—
17

employing water as a means for reaching other goals…” He also shed light on the dominant
power to exploit their position and “use water for political purposes” which in return results in a
strong resistance from the downstream riparian. Frey does not go further to explain the modes of
resistance used by the downstream riparian, or the weaker state, to counter the hydro-hegemonic
tactics used to control the water resources. Freys contribution to this field opened up a space to
view water conflicts from a power relations dynamic and this resulted in the conception of the
18

Framework of Hydro Hegemony (FHH) by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006) . This
shaped the discourse on ‘water wars’ and allowed authors such as Zeitoun to build off from
Freys (1993) power analytic framework.
In the article, “Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of trans-boundary water
conflicts” the FHH has been explored by Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner where they define
hydro hegemony as “hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control

Ibid, p 61.
Ibid, p 63.
18
Zeitoun, M. & Warner, J. (2006). Hydro-hegemony – a framework for analysis of
trans-boundary water conflicts. Water Policy 8(5), 435–460.
16
17

24
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strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment.” Under the FHH, power is the
central factor in analyzing riparian relations and this is achieved by combining the three pillars,
of hydro politics, which was stated above, and by looking at how the hydro-hegemon, that is
characterized as the upper riparian with relatively more power than the downstream riparian,
controls the water resources in transboundary water conflicts.
They look at how the control over water resources is achieved through “power related
tactics and strategies” but they also reveal two important theoretical issues that need to be
addressed. The first is acknowledging that transboundary water cooperation are oftentimes
lauded for their success, but in reality the absence of water wars, does not amount to the absence
of water conflict and this is due to the underlying asymmetric power relations. Second, they
reveal that power relations should be a major factor in analyzing the relations between two
20

riparians in a water conflict . They acknowledge that the riparian position is important when
looking at exploitation of water resources, but looking at this from a power relations perspective
is a major element in providing a more nuanced analysis.
Zeitoun and Warner distinguish themselves from previous scholars in that they
conceptualize and theorize “hydro-hegemony” and build off from previous scholars’ approaches
to water conflict and combine their work into the FHH, specifically Frey’s (1993) power analytic
framework. Moreover, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) move past predictions to stress on “the
dynamics of water conflict” and reveal the tactics and strategies that are used under hydro

19
20

Ibid, p. 435.
Ibid, p. 436.

25
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hegemony but also of counter-hegemony . The Figure below outlines the water resource control
strategies.

22

Figure 3: “Water Resource Control Strategies and Tactics”

Looking at these strategies and tactics, it is significant to note that settler colonialism also
engages in some of these tactics to consolidate it’s control and achieve its greater goal. Yet that
is done over time and the goal of settler colonialism is to eliminate the native and access lands..
Furthermore, they reveal that resorting to violence in water politics is a very rare occurrence.
Zeitoun and Warner (2006) also stress on the disguise of the cooperation agreements that are
signed between the two riparians. Both authors indicate the power asymmetry that arises from
such “cooperation” and reveal the areas where these asymmetries can be seen apparent. Such as
“structural inequalities, the lack of control over decisions and an inequitable allocation of the

Ibid, p. 437.
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Zeitoun

and Warner (2006), p. 445.
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resource or its benefits” . In light of this they conclude that this type of dominant form of
hydro-hegemony is characterized by the dominant’s power to deny water rights for the weaker
state.
A more in depth analysis of the power structures that are prevalent in cooperative
agreements which contribute to the hydro-political nature of water conflicts have also been
examined. In Jan Selby’s, “Cooperation, Domination and Colonisation: The Israeli-Palestinian
Joint Water Committee” (2013) he addresses by stating that cooperation can sometimes be
disguised as hegemony and power and the creation of such transboundary water management
24

does not thereby bring an end to the conflict . He does so by providing an analysis of the Joint
Water Committees record since 1995-2008 and following that with a comprehensive
interpretation of the interests and powers that have been the foundation of the overall water
regime. Selby succeeds in addressing how Oslo II revealed the ambitions of Israel to colonise the
lands in the West Bank and expand it’s settlement enterprise. This form of cooperative
agreement is in reality a containment strategy that has subtly forced the Palestinian Authority
25

“assent to its own colonisation. ” Selby notes three important interests and policies that Israel
used in Oslo II, specifically the structure of JWC and its permit regime, to ensure the limit of
Palestinian pariticipation but also the creation of an agreement that cearly reflects Israeli
preferences. He addresses the water supply crisis that Palestinians in the West Bank face due to
Israel’s purposeful restriction of Palestinain development of the Mountain Aquifer.

The

Ibid. p. 439.
Selby, J. 2013. Cooperation, domination and colonisation: The Israeli-Palestinian Joint Water
committee. Water Alternatives 6(1): 1-24
25
Ibid. p. 21,
23
24

27
discourse on water in the realm of politics goes hand in hand with transboundary water conflicts,
water wars and water cooperation and management. reproach
Filippo Menga, a professor and a researcher at Reading University conducts
interdisciplinary research exploring the interplay between humans and the environment, in his
article titled “Reconceptualizing hegemony: the circle of hydro-hegemony,” argues that there
needs to be a more extensive analysis centered around the interactions of power and
hydro-hegemony. He does acknowledge the importance of the tools and analysis that is provided
by the Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, but he also addresses the limitations of FHH and views
that the representation of power through the three pillars, power, riparian position and resources,
does not provide a comprehensive analysis of hegemony. Therefore, Menga proposes the Circle
of Hydro-Hegemony (CHH) where he views the riparian position, the ideational power, and
bargaining power intertwined with hydro-hegemony. Menga also emphasizes the importance of
expanding the discourse and research on counter hegemony. While he does succeed in
addressing this he does not explore counter hegemony. However, he sees the CHH as a model
that could address that further. According to Menga, “CHH could be employed to examine the
continuous process through which a hegemonized basin riparians attempts to challenge and
contest a disadvantageous status-quo.” He concludes suggesting a comparative study to look at
the various counter hegemonic tactics employed by different riparians.
Selby and Mark Zeitoun are in conversation in the majority of their works, building from
each others’ arguments and furthering the debate and discourse on hydro-hegemony, domination,
and cooperation. Hence, hydro-politics is crucial in understanding how these conflicts came to
emerge and how these treaties were created based on power relations. The works of Mark

28
Zeitoun (2008) and Aaron Wolf have been instrumental in the field of hydro-politics as their
bodies of literature seek to examine the underlying factors which give rise to hydro-political and
transboundary conflicts in which both authors build off from each other in their works. Aaron
Wolf’s work on showing how treaties between parties or states do not necessarily amount to
26

cooperation.

Unequal distribution of water resources has been one of the driving forces

towards hydro-politics and this is characterized by the asymmetric relation, which can be defined
as hydro-hegemony.
In his book, Power and Water in the Middle East: The Hidden Politics of the
Palestinian-Israeli Water Conflict, Mark Zeitoun (2008) uses social power theorist Antonio
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony—use of a dominant ideology, coupled with force to maintain
hegemony over the masses— to provide a clearer understanding of his notion of
hydro-hegemony. In his work, Zeitoun builds off from his previous work (2006) and uses the
Israel-Palestine water conflict as the main case study, seeking to examine the “Hidden Politics”
of the water conflict. Power asymmetry, the economic and strategic value of water, in addition to
27

‘virtual water’ are the three reasons Zeitoun provides that explain the absence of water waters .
Due to the asymmetric relation between the weaker downstream state and the stronger upper
stream state water wars are least likely to occur considering the fact that the weaker state does
28

not have the power and capacity to challenge the upper state . Zeitoun emphasises this in length
by referring to the Palestinain-Israeli case, where asymmetry was apparent in the 1995 Oslo
29

Accords which was “structured to limit Palestinian participation” Building off from his work,

Wolf, Aaron T. 2007. Shared Waters : Conflict and Cooperation / Aaron T. Wolf.
Zeitoun (2008) Page 4
28
Ibid. Page 7
29
Ibid. Page 8
26
27

29
Zeitoun reiterates that the absence of war does not amount to an absence of conflict, hence, water
30.

in such situations is used as a weapon or a target

Zeitoun’s work addresses the issue from a hydro-hegemonic approach and notes the
underlying root causes of the Palestinian-Israeli water conflict. While he succeeds in taking into
account the disparity between the supply of water to the Palestinians versus the Israeli settlers
and the “hydrological apartheid” structure that contributes to this inequal distributiona and
control over water, he does not explicilty stress on the concept of settler colonialism. Zeitoun
acknowledges how the growing Israeli settlement enterprise plays a major role in this
“hydrological apartheid.” This is especially seen when referring to the Israeli settlement
industrial and agricultural farms that are supplied with greater quantities of water than the
Palestinian farmers noting that “the big conflict is over agricultural water.”

31

While the current available literature succeeds in providing a comprehensive
conceptualization of hydro-hegemony and examines the power asymmetry that is evident
between riparians, it does not look at water issues from a settler colonial perspective. Using a
settler colonial framework to address water issues, specifically Israeli-Palestinian water issues
has not been previously addressed in length. Looking at how water control changed over time is
not a factor that is analyzed under hydro-hegemony. Nevertheless, when examining the role of
Israel as a hydro-hegemon the available literature does illuminate the tactics and strategies that
Israel uses to engage in water control but it does not go beyond to examine its actions as a result
of being a settler colonial state and how its tactics and strategies have intensified over time.
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Settler Colonialism
Settler Colonial Studies has been a crucial disciplinary field that contributes to the
understanding of the policies and frameworks underlying settler-colonialism, in addition to
providing a comparative analysis with other forms of colonial projects. It emerged as a result of
32

the existing structural inequalities between indigenous people and their counterparts, the settler.

Using a settler colonial framework to serve as a foundation to distinguish colonialism from
settler colonialism, it also seeks to answer the differences between both. Even though both are
intertwined, yet certain elements stand out as separate and or different from colonialism overall.
Scholars such as Lorenzo Veracini (2011) have been at the forefront in introducing settler
colonial studies and he has coined the term settler-colonialism.
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There has been rich body of literature examining the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict and
these bodies of literature study the conflict from various concepts. The overall Israeli occupation
of Palestine is seen as a settler-colonial project which differs from colonialism.
Settler-colonialism, as a practice, is aimed at replacing the indigenous people with settlers and
eliminating their traces through violence and oppression. On the other hand colonialism is aimed
at colonizing the land and using the indigenous for labor. Settler colonialism in the case of
Israel-Palestine is a form of settler colonization which colonizes the land and forms what Patrick
34

Wolfe refers to as “settler society. ”
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One important factor that distinguished settler colonialism from other forms of
domination and control frameworks is time. In his book on Settler Colonialism and the
Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnograph Event (Writing Past
Imperialism), W
 olfe’s (1999) oft-quoted statement in settler colonial literature, “settler invasion
is a structure, not an event” emphasizes the prolonged existence of settler colonialisms effects
from the past to present. This is significant because it shows the longevity of settler colonialism
and the way its process develops over time and expands. It is not a single event, it is a slow creep
that is guided by the “logic of elimination.” Domination and control under settler colonialism
does not happen over a single event, on the contrary, it’s effects can be seen over time.
Veracini’s article, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies” (2011) he studies colonialism
and settler colonialism as two concepts and distinct structures, that being, settler-colonialism has
an aim of not only exploiting the local indigenous population but also eliminating them from
their lands. While colonized people experience domination and exploitation and engage in
“unequal labor relations” as a mode of survival and a way to preserve their “distinct groups.”
They also view the local population as an obstacle to the formation of their state. He further goes
on to analyse the various modes of resistance through the use of anti-colonialist rhetoric aimed
at decolonization.
Nevertheless, in his article “Containment, Elimination, Endogeneity: Settler Colonialism
35

in the Global Present, Rethinking Marxism” Veracini (2019) not only builds off from Wolfe’s
work but he opens a space aimed at providing an analogy between the present global structure
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that is characterized by neo-liberal capitalist accumulation and the historical policies of settler
colonialism.Veracini goes back to say that settler colonialism is not interested in the indigenous
labor, but interested in indigenous land. Furthermore, Veracini views containment as elimination
and inherently related to settler colonialism. Looking back at the Framework of Hydro
Hegemony, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) address containment as a water control strategy to
achieve hegemony at the river basin level. The overlaps of these strategies show that a link can
be drawn form FHH and settler colonialism, but that is insufficient since both have different
goals to achieve.
In “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native” Wolfe (2006) examines past
colonial cases to build his argument, he explores the link between genocide and settler
36

colonialism which he refers to as “logic of elimination.” This article, among the other articles
which have contributed to the vast body of literature on settler colonialism, is widely cited by
other scholars. He notes the relation of race to genocide and settler colonialism pointing out that
race is made up when a particular group of people are targeted, such as the racialization of blacks
37

as slaves. Hence, Wolfe shows that race is not the basis of elimination, but “access to territory”
is. He provides a comparative analysis of settler colonial cases on Australia, Israel-Palestine,
and the United States. The underlying premise of settler colonialism is centered around the idea
of land and the elimination of the indigenous people. In addition, this genealogy of colonialism
provides a comprehensive understanding of the emergence of many states today. Wolfe’s (2006)
argument thus attempts to show how settler colonialism has the potential to be the driving force
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behind a genocide, yet he emphasises that settler colonialism is not a form of genocide, since
genocides can take place without the occurence of settler colonialism. However, the
commonality it has with genocide is that “it strives for the dissolution of native societies” if the
actions of a settler-colonial state intensifies and is neglected by the international community.
Relating Patrick Wolfe’s literature to Mark Zeitoun’s (2008), there is a clear correlation
between the data on the

Israeli settlement as a “resource-consuming project” and Wolfe’s
38

emphasis on agriculture as being “inherently sedentary” in the context of settler colonialism
and its expansion through continuous grab of native lands. This is significant as it shows how
both their works compliment each other, and Zeitoun succeeds in providing a case study that
proves the impact of settler colonialism on every sector of society.
It is important to expand on hydro-hegemony to acknowledge that settler colonial states
who engage in water control and behave as hegemons are not only trying to achieve the mere
goal of consolidating control over water resources but it is one of the tools they use to achieve
their greater goal of eliminating and erasing the native from their lands.

Environmental Colonialism and Injustice
Kyle Whyte, on the other hand focuses on settler-colonialism as a form of ecological
domination resulting in environmental injustices towards the indigenous people. Literature such
39

as Whyte’s Settler Colonialism, Ecology, and Environmental Injustice (2018) , helps broaden
the research in this field by focusing on one of the consequences of settler-colonialism,
environmental and ecological domination. This provides a greater understanding of
Wolfe (2006)p. 395
Whyte, Kyle. 2018. “Settler Colonialism, Ecology, and Environmental Injustice.” Environment
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settler-colonialism by showing the impacts of its policies which target every aspect of the
natives' society. In his Indigenous Experience, Environmental Justice and Settler Colonialism
(2016), Whyte argues that environmental injustices inflicted upon indigenous people is due to the
“development of settler nations” through various means such as military invasion, capitalist
40

exploitation and anti-indigenous policies.

He refers to Canada’s Aamjiwnaang First Nation,

and the United States as examples. In line with Veracini and Patrick Wolfe, Whyte emphasizes
settler colonialism’s injustice towards the natives. Not only does he look at it as a form of
elimination of the native’s society, but “robbing another society of its capacities to experience
the world as a place of collective life."
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In this work and in related references it was observed that settler colonialism is not only
exploiting resources in the territories they colonize but also sending the profits and resources to
the metropolitan, capital city. Whyte’s (2018) contribution to this field is the inclusion of
environmental injustice as a result of settler colonialism that interferes and erases the
socioecological experience of the indigenous population. Whyte also focuses on the concept of
domination from an ecological standpoint. He emphasizes on the ecological domination of an
indigenous people by the settler population is aimed at creating ecologies of their own at the
expense of the indigenous.
Relating this back to Patrick Wolfe’s literature, there is a clear correlation between
Zeitoun’s (2008) data on the Israeli settlement as a “resource-consuming project” and Wolfe’s
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emphasis on agriculture as being “inherently sedentary” in the context of settler colonialism
and its expansion through continuous grab of native lands. This is significant as it shows how
both their works compliment each other, and Zeitoun succeeds in providing a case study that
proves the impact of settler colonialism on every sector of society. Therefore, my contribution to
the existing literature will be to explicitly intertwine the concept of settler colonialism and hydro
hegemony as an attempt towards building an understanding that aims at showcasing the negative
impacts of settler colonialism in the field of the environment on the indigneous population.
Counter-Hegemony, Sumud, and Everyday forms of Resistance
While these authors succeed in providing a comprehensive analysis of hydro-hegemony,
the concept of counter-hegemony or resistance to hegemony was not extensively explored,
specifically in the Jordan River basin, considering that it is one of the most studied
transboundary water conflicts. Looking at resistance to hydro- hegemony is crucial in
understanding how local populations are impacted by the power dynamics. While this is not
extensively written about, using a settler colonial framework will help to build an understanding
of how Palestinians at the local level engage in resistance to counter Israel’s settler colonial
policies. My contribution to this section and to the available literature is to explore the everyday
forms of resistance that Palestinians engage in against Israel’s control over the water resources.
Zeitoun and Warner (2006) highlight the urgency to further explore the “anti-hegemonic
resistance tactics” they specify the areas that need to be explored such as “effect of time, of
silence, the “cost of no agreement” and methods of issue de-securitization.”
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Since time is an

important factor in settler colonialism, using it as a framework of analysis towards understanding
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Zeitoun and Warner’s (2006) point on exploring the “effect of time” can be helpful in
understanding how resistance to hydro-hegemony changes over time.
Joseph Ivanka Wessels, visual anthropologist and human geographer, also addresses the
limited empirical research that has been conducted with regards to counter-hegemony and
agency at local level in the Jordan River basin. In her article “Challenging hydro-hegemony:
hydro-politics and local resistance in the Golan Heights and the Palestinian territories” (2015)

44

she presents a comparative case study of two different border communities, the occupied Golan
Heights and the West Bethlehem Villages in Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPt). She explores these communities who are “living under Israeli military occupation and
experiencing the impact of hydro politics in everyday life.” One aspect that stands out in
Wessel’s work is her focus of analysis which is centered around the local level rather than state
level. This is significant due to the little research done on the local impacts of hydro-hegemony.
She addresses agency and resistance to military occupation at the local level in the Jordan basin.
Another area that Wessel explores, which was not present in the previous literature discussed, is
45

“how colonial logics are expressed in hegemonic praxis and counter-hegemony. ” However, she
does not use a settler colonial framework to address that, but she does acknowledge that Israeli
colonial policies in the Jordan Valley are aimed at a total annexation on the basis of security.

46

She also emphasises that the lack of recognition for either citizenship and nationality are some
of the main factors that drive the communities to engage in counter hegemonic modes of
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resistance. Wessel views this as a manifestation of Israeli colonial logic and a further
consolidation of hydro- hegemony in the Jordan River basin. This type of analysis is important in
understanding the power dynamics beyond the three pillars of the FHH and to understand how
the power established from this position is exerted to the local level. In addition to how the
power of the “weaker state” or the power of the hegemonized is channeled back through various
modes of resistance.
She concludes by showing the forms of nonviolent resistance that were used in both cases
to address counter hegemonic praxis. Legal actions, non-violent popular resistance, were the
methods that were used, in addition Wessel explores the notions of citizenship, cultural heritage
and identities and states that “these form a strong basis for counter hegemony and human
47

agency.” She also views that the occupied communities continue to counter the Israeli colonial
48

discourse and narrative through their mere existence and their identity serves as a social power.

This can be seen as counter hegemony and or resistance to the sanctioned discourse that Zeitoun
and Warner (2006) had discussed.
Veracini (2019) explores “how oppositional movements in recent years have adopted
recognizably indigenous modes of resistance” and he emphasizes on the importance of
indigenous struggles. One of these modes which he discusses is place-based protests which is the
connection to the place where a specific identity can be tied too. This can be related to Wessel’s
emphasis on strong local attachment and identity that
fundamentally indigenous mode of protest”
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Veracini (2019)

views as “a
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One of the major contributions to the field of resistance has been provided by James
Scott. In his book Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance (1985), he studies the
50

peasant and slave societies and their everyday forms of resistance to domination . He reveals the
informal everyday forms of resistance that is common among the peasantry and lower class
especially among those who are not politically organized. He sees peasant rebellions and
revolutions as less likely to be successful, therefore he seeks to understand the everyday forms of
resistance that peasants engage in. He defines this as “the prosaic but constant struggle between
the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents and interest from them.” He
also reveals the weapons used such “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertions, false compliance,
51

pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage and so on.” Scotts states that peasants in
the Third World are less likely to confront the authorities, so instead they resort to other forms of
disobedience, or non compliance.
Jeff Halper (2006), an anthropologist and the former coordinator of the Israeli Committee
Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), looks at the collective reaction implied by the Palestinians
to counter the occupation as an effective strategy which has prevented “there Israeli military and
52

colonial machine from defeating them”

In his article “A Strategy within a Non-Strategy:

Sumud, Resistance, Attrition, and Advocacy” Halper looks at the steadfastness (sumud) and
resistance of the Palestinians peasants, working class and petit bourgeoisie to the Israeli
occupation. He defines this as “resistance that takes forms of daily coping, an insistence on
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carrying on one’s life and a refusal to be cowards, as well as active and intentional forms of
53

struggle”

Building off from Halper’s view on sumud as an everyday form of resistance Philippe
Bourbeau and Caitlin Ryan (2018) show how sumud is also a form of “resilient resistance” in
54

their article “Resilience, Resistance, Infrapolitics and Enmeshment.” They address the different
debates centered around sumud being either a form of resistance or not and they argue that
sumud is a form of resistance. They also explain how sumud emerged as a result of the
constraints that were placed on organized political struggle during the late 1970 and early 1980s.
According to Bourbeau and Ryan

“In the context of the ever shifting occupation, one can

frame one’s daily activities as sumud, particularly when those daily activities aim to make life
‘normal’ in the context of the ‘abnormal’ occupation” To show how that is applied in Palestine,
they address the daily struggle of Palestinians in the West Bank to secure adequate water and the
alternatives they seek to “get on” or “make life ‘normal.’” Based on Ryan’s fieldwork and
interviews in a village in the West Bank they reveal the adjustments Palestinians have to make to
secure access to water, such as filling water tanks on the roof. They view this as one example of
the impact the occupation has on the daily lives of the Palestinians and the adjustments that
Palestinians have to cope with are seen as forms of resistance “or defiance of the occupation
55

forces.” Yet they emphasize that these forms of resistance should not be viewed as “giving in
to the occupation.” On the contrary, they state that sumud provides the Palestinians with
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“strategies” to adapt to the occupation and these should be seen as resistance and resilience and
not as acceptance to the ‘abnormality’ of the occupation.
Abeer al-Butmerh et. al (2019) view resistance to settler colonialism as a struggle for
environmental justice due to Israel’s pillaging of natural resources , exploitation and annexation
56

of land and resource dispossession .

Contribution
After examining both frameworks it is evident that there is an overlap of the tactics and
strategies between hydro-hegemony and settler colonialism that which states use to achieve their
goals, and this is the area where both frameworks intertwine. (See Figure 4 for a breakdown of
hydro-hegemony, colonialism, and settler colonialism) Nevertheless, it is evident that more
research needs to be conducted on counter-hegemony, therefore, using settler colonial
framework will be helpful in understanding how occupied or hegemonized populations react to
the ever changing modes of domination.

Therefore, it is important to expand on

hydro-hegemony to acknowledge that settler colonial states who engage in water control and
behave as hegemons are not only trying to achieve the mere goal of consolidating control over
water resources, but it is one of the tools they use to achieve their greater goal of eliminating and
erasing the native from their lands. This can be seen in the containment strategy, sanctioned
discourse, and coercion pressure. Hence Israel's containment water strategy, which includes
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signing of treaties, should be viewed not just as a form of hydro-hegemony and domination but
as a settler colonial strategy of elimination. As Veracini (2011) states “settler colonialism
domination was instituted as a means to facilitate indigenous disappearances but the settler
colonial would consider equality, recognition, provided that indigenous disappearances could be
57

exacted otherwise. ” This is significant because the containment strategy, in addition to the
sanctioned discourse, are all settler colonial tools that are part of a greater agenda of eliminating
the native.

57

Veracini (2011), p. 8.
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Figure 4: Chart comparing hydro-hegemony, colonialism, and settler colonialism.
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Chapter 4: Background
The Zionist Movement and Political Ideology:
It is important to note that the water conflict in the region is not due to scarcity or lack of
water, but it has been caused by the Arab-Israeli conflict. The underlying factors and root causes
of this water crisis is a result of two reasons, the “politically induced” Jewish immigration to the
region and the Zionists’ outlook and approach to the environment. Their political, economic, and
58

military policies were shaped by their approach to the environment. The Zionist ideology and
their movement began in the late eighteenth century as a reactionary movement towards the rise
59

of European nationalism,

and this political ideology aimed at establishing a Jewish national
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homeland in Palestine . Returning to their ‘home,’ Eretz Israel or the Land of Israel was a move
that encouraged Jews to migrate to Palestine.
The Zionist movement emerged as a result of pressure on Jews to either assimilate or
continue being victims of persecution—s ince they were constantly being perceived as exiles.
Assimilation went against the Jewish cultural and religious values thus giving rise to the Zionist
movement and ideology. Hence, the emergence of Zionism in Europe occurred in two different
61

ways . In the Central parts of Europe it emerged as an intellectual conceptualization which was
led by Theodor Herzel, and in Eastern Europe, it was as a solution to the Jewish plight.
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Israeli historian and activist, Illan Pappe has argued that Zionism started as a national
62

movement but acted as pure colonialism . The colonization of Palestine was carried out by
Zionist thinkers who claimed the territory through the use of biblical justifications.
Dispossessing and eliminating Palestinians from their lands was openly talked about by Zionist
leaders. This was seen in Hertzl’s statement when talking about the Palesitnians saying: "We
must expropriate gently the private property on the state assigned to us...Both the process of
63

expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly ."
With numerous failed efforts to implant the Zionist settler communities in Palestine, this
was accomplished following the Basel conference in 1897, which was the First Zionist Congress.
Wealthy Jewish financers funded institutions such as the Jewish National Fund—Keren
Kayemeth Le Israel (KKL) to create Jewish settlements by taking control of Palestinian lands.
64

JNF institution opened the door for the Zionist movement to make way in Palestine . In
addition, according to Gasteyer et al. (2012) they state that “early tours of Palestine by the JNF
explicitly sought land that could yield a return on investment, and maps were developed to
65

identify ideal locations in proximity to water resources for irrigation.”

Their ambitions of

modernisation as a way to bring in more Jewish settlers prompted the establishment of the
National Water Company, Mek0rot in 1937. Mekorot was established by the JNF, Histadrut-the
Zionist labour organisation, and the Palestine Land Development Corporation (PLDC) to manag
66

water.
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Zionist Romanticization of the Environment: Justifications of Dispossesion
The foundational myths that is perpetuated by the Zionist discourse centers around the
statement of “a land without people for people without land” and “making the desert bloom.”
This philosophy is based on the dispossession of Palestinian indigenous people through various
tactics and the colonization of lands.

67

Thus, ethnic displacement and dispossession were the
68

main means of occupying land and forming the state of Israel in 1948. Going back to when the
Zionist movement started settling the Jewish migrants in Palestine, a large number of migrants
settled in the Jordan Valley because access to water supply was a prerequisite to their settlement
formation and part of their Zionist aspirations.
Water supply was of vital importance to the Zionists’ search for land and their aspiration
69

towards settling in more lands than those that were ‘biblically promised’ to them. Therefore, to
ensure the survival of the Jewish national home, they needed an unrestricted access to water
70

resources, this for them was a “non-negotiable prerequisite”. Even going back to 1918, the
Zionist delegation at the Peace Conference in Versailles lobbied towards including all the
watershed of Jordan and Yarmouk River “within the borders of the national home for the Jews.”
71

In addition to also embracing all the Jordan Valley lands, they were aspiring to gain the lands
72

of Syria and Lebanon. These, however, were failed attempts that were prevented by the French.
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Within the Zionist movement there was a constant romanticization of the environment
especially during the massive immigrant population. For them, these lands were exotic, the
environment was unfamiliar, and were compounded by the harsh climatic conditions which they
73

were not accustomed to. Hence, the Zionist leaders responded to these concerns in two ways,
romanticizing the environment and conquering it, but also to flourish it and make it “bloom.”
The former led to the politicization of the environment through the use of ideological arguments,
myths, and rituals to help them “overcome obstacles.” These were mere justifications used to
assist them in integrating to the new ‘exotic environment.’

74

In Edward Said’s “Zionism from the Standpoint of its Victims”, he argues that all these
transformative projects which altered and eradicated the realities of Palestine were justified with
arguments of “higher” interest of modernization and improving the pre-existing condition by
75

making it better. This was part and parcel of Said’s prominent concept of “the Oriental mind”
connoting to the European, to the Western perception of “the other.” The Middle East, in
76

particular Palestine, has always been a subject of the West’s “imagination and political will.”
This, he argues, is how modern Zionism originated.

77

The aspect of romanticization of the

environment as exotic can be seen as a result of that. Especially since this contributed to the
Zionist leaders glorifying the nature and perceiving it as a factor that strenghthened if not renewd
the relationship between the Jewish people and the soil.
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Therefore, as Avner de-Shalit, an Israeli political scientist, explains, it played a driving
force in contributing to that sense of ‘returning to the homeland,’ to their original roots, and
paved the way for the Jewish immigrants to become farmers and work on the lands of the Jordan
79

Valley.

Resorting to agriculture was not only a coping mechanism to get accustomed to the

new, alien environment but it was a strategy to create a bond with the land. Hence, the creation
of settlements for Jewish immigrants in water rich areas was essential in expanding their
80

presence from Jewish centers, such as Jerusalem and Safad, to rural areas.

Inhabiting in these

lands was a way for the Zionist leaders to perpetuate the myth of “land without poeple” claiming
that this was an uninhabited desert.

81

This argument not only undermines the severity of the

catastrophe that Palestinians suffered but also provides room for denial and silencing of the
Palestinian narrative and

collective history. Such discourses were used to justify the

establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.
Even though other Zionist leaders were aware of the presence of Arabs in Palestine and
in the valleys, they still emphasized on the notion of “technical superiority of their agriculture to
82

that of the native farmers.” Going back to Said’s point on “higher” interest, Jewish immigrants
viewed their superiority as a tool to exploit agriculture and claimed that due to sovereignty and
83

superiority they are more efficient than the Palestinians. These were the initial steps towards
84

environmental colonialism and injustice, the “development of settler nations.”

As Whyte
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(2018) argues that environmental injustices inflicted upon indigenous people is due to the
“development of settler nations” through various means such as military invasion, capitalist
exploitation and anti-indigenous policies. These were also the beginning steps towards erasing
the sociological and ecological experiences of the indigenous people. Nevertheless, when Israel
occupied the West Bank in 1967, it executed a plan which resulted in the expulsion of the largest
number of Palestinians. According to Ahmad Huneity, the expulsions in the Jordan Valley were
85

the most systematic and deliberate.

Policies of Israel in the Jordan Valley and the importance of Jordan Valley to Palestine
The Zionist vision of the great Jewish state stretches from the Nile to the Euphrates, thus
water is of strategic and ideological importance for Israel. They also claim that they have the
86

right to the water in that entire region . The Israeli interest in the Jordan Valley at the beginning
of its occupation in the West Bank, was due to security reasons. It formed its security guard for
87

Israel in the face of any Arab attempts to wage war.

Immediately following its occupation of the West Bank in 1967, Israel took various
measures to guarantee its control of surface and underground water found in the West Bank.
Israel also issued several military orders guaranteeing its control over the water resources,
including Resolution No. 98 of 1967 --- which gives the Israeli army full authority over all
88

matters relating to water in the Palestinian territories, Mekorot . It also prohibited Palestinian
construction of water infrastructure without obtaining a military issued permit. Even after the
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1995 Oslo II Agreement, another military order was implemented on June 7, 1997 which states,
89

″all the water resources that have been occupied again are the property of the state of Israel″ .
Various measures and policies have been implemented to limit the access of Palestinians to
water, it also enclosed several Palestinian springs by declaring the surrounding area as closed
military zones or nature reserves.
As for the Palestinians, the addition of the Jordan Valley to Israel means the loss of the
Palestinian state at least 30 percent of its area, and thus the elimination of any aspirations for
Palestine to establish a state with that area. The Jordan Valley is of strategic and political
interest For the future state of Palestine, the Jordan Valley constitutes the most vital area for the
90

implementation of developmental projects. According to a Palestinians government official the
Jordan Valley is the space for a viable state, there is no viable state without the Jordan Valley.
The Jordan Valley is viewed as the breadbasket of the future state of Palestine; it is the place
where people can irrigate, a place where it can also enable other conflict solutions for refugees
and water and solve them in the newly born state.
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Chapter 5: The Case of Bardala
The village of Bardala is situated in the northern part of the Jordan Valley and in the
North Eastern corner of Tubas Governorate located thirteen kilometers northeast of Tubas and
twenty eight kilometers northeast of Nablus. As mentioned previously, the process of
dispossessing the Palestinian inhabitants from the Jordan Valley was not limited to refugee
camps in the city of Jericho, but dozens of villages were destroyed and large number of its
populations were displaced. The permit regime, attack on water facilities, and control of water
resources are all part of the greater settler colonial policies used against Palestinians. Therefore,
to gain an understanding of this, and relating it to the bigger conflict, this chapter provides a case
study of the village of Bardala and analyzes the data collected from the research to show how the
growing settler colonial policies have been impacting the way Palestinians in the village
experience water on the ground.
Through semi-structured interviews and participant observation with some of the
residents from the village I was able to understand the situation first hand. The data obtained
from the interviews and secondary sources displayed the intensified settler colonial policies that
are not only discriminatory by nature but constitute grave violations and breaches to human
rights law and international law. A timeline was also prepared to show the major interventions in
Bardala, see Figure 5 below.
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Figure 5: Timeline of major events in Bardala

Data compiled from ARIJ news reports.
ARIJ. 2014: Two Families From Bardala Receive Notices to Stop Construction of Their
Agricultural Facilities (Original text in Arabic)
93
94

52
According to a fact sheet published by Ma’an Center for Development in 2013, in their
efforts to shed light on the systematic efforts of Judaization in the Jordan Valley, and the forced
displacement against the Palestinian population through a gradual control of land, house
95

demolitions and theft of natural resources they reported that 30 villages including pastoral ruins
and plains were destroyed during the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Among these, was the
96

Ka’oun plain , located near the Green Line, which was destroyed in 1948 and its inhabitants
were forcefully displaced to Jordan, the city of Toubas, and some settled in the village of
97

Bardala. Moreover, during the 1967 Six Day War, Bardala had a population of 500 inhabitants
who were divided among fifty to sixty families. Following the war, only ten families remained.

98

99

Today Bardala has a population of 1,637 inhabitants. Majority of the inhabitants in the village
depend on agriculture as their source of income and livelihood, yet since 1967 Israel has
systematically controlled the most basic necessity and the main natural resource that the
inhabitants need to sustain, water.
In efforts to isolate the Palestinian communities from the rest of the Jordan Valley,
starting in the early 2000’s Israel began erecting military checkpoints and roadblocks near
Bardala. This was within the Israeli plan to isolate the Jordan Valley from its Palestinian
surroundings, and then gradually annex it to Israel after emptying its Palestinian residents. This
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was further intensified in 2007 when Israel transferred the military checkpoint near Bardala to
100

“international crossings.” According to a Palestinian journalist ,
Recognizing military checkpoints as international crossings means you are crossing from
country to country and since Bardala is on the border of the Green Line, this means
crossing from a Palestinian territory to Israeli occupied territories past the Green Line.
Hence, stricter security procedures
Such efforts can be seen as settler colonial policies have systematically targeted Palestinians in
efforts to prevent the development of Palestinian towns and to eventually dispossess them from
their lands. In this context, water has been used as a tool and at the same time as a weapon to
control and dominate the Palestinians.

The Slow Creep of Settler Colonial Structures and Processes
The case of Bardala is a microcosm of the realities Palestinians living in the Jordan
101

Valley experience on a daily basis. In this context, looking at settler colonialism Jamal , a
resident from the village, recalled how Bardala was always known for its natural springs and
mineral water. He tells me how some families had their own wells which supplied them with
water for agriculture and domestic use. According to a World Bank Report, even before 1967,
102

eight Palestinian wells were built for domestic and agricultural purposes . In addition there
were 209 wells in the Jordan Valley prior to 1967. However, following the Six Day War, two

Interview conducted by author.
Note: Names have been changed for the purpose of maintaining the anonymity of their
identities.
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deep wells were constructed by Israel in Bardala, one in 1968 and the second one in 1979.

According to B'tselem, a non-profit Israeli information center for human rights in the Occupied
Territories,
The drillings, like those next to Bardala and Ein al-Beida’, are located on the hydrologic
channel of the Mountain Aquifer, between the recharge area of the aquifer in the central
West Bank mountain strip and the aquifer’s eastern outlet in the Jordan Valley
Furthermore, according to the World Bank (2009) The water level in the Palestinian wells
104

dropped at the rate of 2 meters a year, and salinity increased ” In addition to the drying of the
majority local springs that Palestinians used. This was the beginning of the slow creep of settler
colonial tools to control and exploit the water resources of the village. According to a Palestinian
government official he stated “Israel is using water not only for consumption and agricultural
uses but as a political issue and a way to control land.” This has been the case in Bardala and in
many other Palestinian villages and communities where water is being used a political tool to
105

occupy more lands. Frey (1993)

discussed this when he explored the power relations of

riparians and viewed water as a political weapon that is used to achieve greater goals. In an
interview with an expert working with the Palestinian Hydrology Group, an NGO focusing on
water and sanitation issues, he explained to me how the water needs of the Palestinians are used
to achieve non water interest. He added “The Israeli logic is as follows: ‘I give you water but I
will take land, I will not give you water because I have a settlement to expand.” In addition he
acknowledges Mark Zeitoun’s emphasis on hydro-hegemony and its balance of powers, but he
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states “this does not mean that due to the weaker position of the Palestinians that we have to let
go of the other tools such as legal international law and humanitarian international law.” He said
these are tools we have not used yet. He further adds “Yes, there is a political dispute over the
water resources but there is a commitment and obligation from the international community as
human beings towards this issue. Being under occupation does not mean we cannot have access
to water”
To further consolidate their control, according to the interviewees in Bardala, Israel and
the residents of the village reached an agreement regarding the supply of water. One resident
explained, “they told us ‘turn off the water you receive from your wells and we will supply you
with water at its prime cost.’” Since then the Palestinian owners of the wells receive their
allocation of water from Mekorot, the national water company of Israel that manages the water
supply

106

.

Other tactics used by Israel to consolidate their control over the wells was through the
1995 II Oslo Accords that divided the occupied West Bank into three administrations. The area
with the wells was designated under Area C, full Israeli civil and security control, however, the
land around it was under Area B, Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security
control.

107

(See Figure 6 for a Map of Oslo Designated Areas, Area A, B, C and lands off limits

to Palestinians).

WeWorld-GVC. “Rehabilitation of Bardala, ‘Ein el Beida, and Kardala Irrigation Systems”
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Figure 6 for a Map of Oslo Designated Areas,
Area A, B, C and lands off limits to Palestinians

57

What has always been hailed as an ideal ‘cooperative agreement’ Selby critiques it by
stating Oslo is “cooperation dressed as domination.”

108

This cooperative agreement is

underpinned by an asymmetric relation between the hydro-hegemon and the hegemonised, in
addition, the power asymmetry can be seen in the structure of utilizing the three main
transboundary water resources, the Jordan River, the Coastal Aquifer, and the Mountain Aquifer.
The groundwater from the Mountain Aquifer flows from the “heights of the West Bank towards
Israel or eastwards into the Jordan Valley.” Furthermore, not only did Oslo II limit Palestinian
participation, but it also created the “most intrusive transboundary policy coordination anywhere
109

in the world ” which was under the administration of the Joint Water Committee. This is seen
110

in the Annex II, Schedule 8 of Oslo II 1995 :
1) a. All licensing and drilling of new wells and the increase of extraction from any water
source, by either side, shall require the prior approval of the JWC.
1) b. All development of water resources and systems, by either side, shall require the
prior approval of the JWC.
2) d. Plans for construction of new water and sewage systems or modification of existing
systems require the prior approval of the JWC.
Under hydro-hegemony, Zeitoun and Warner (2006) view this power asymmetry as part of the
tactics that a hegmon uses to consolidate its control over the water resources. They refer to this
as the containment strategy where a hydro- hegemony contains the weaker state in an
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asymmetric position. Veracini (2019) equates containment to elimination and a form of
dispossession. The bureaucratic and burdensome process of the permit regime is an example of
militarization of control over the water resources and the implementation of settler colonial
policies on indigenous people. Settler colonialism not only restricts Palestinians from their right
to equitable access to water but it also results in creating new ecologies at the expense of the
indigenous lands. Kyle Whyte (2018) states that settler colonialism “commits environmental
injustice through the violent disruption of human relationships to the environment.”

111

Settler

colonial measures to erase, disrupt, and eliminate the native does not only happen by force but
also through the undermining of the self-determination of the indigenous people.
The power asymmetry is evident in the case of Bardala’s wells. As Zeitoun (2008) notes
“deep wells are drilled where the powerful say they will be drilled” and this is what took place in
112

Bardala .

The nature of this power asymmetry highlights the distinction between the dominant

and the occupied. The villagers’ lack of agency over their resources, due to the ever growing
militarized occupation, is the goal of settler colonialism, to consolidate their power over the
Palestinians. The exclusion of Palestinian indigenous people through the use of water as an
113

essential target is the process of eliminating the natives . Selby (2013) notes that this intrusive
structure of the water permit regime and of Oslo II “provided Israel with a means of continuing
to restrict Palestinian consumption, and of maintaining its hegemony over the Mountain
114

Aquifer.”

The restrictions placed on water by Israel has destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds

of thousands of people whose livlihoods in the village were impacted by the drying of the

Kyle White, 2018 p.125
Zeitoun (2008) p. 7.
113
P. Wolfe (2006) p. 390.
114
Selby (2013)p. 15.
111
112

59
Palestinian wells

115

. To restrict Palestinians from accessing water, they first restrict them from

accessing land. In a report published by B’tselem titled Dispossession and Exploitation Israel’s
Policy in the Jordan Valley and Northern Dead Sea, the author Eyal Hareuveni discusses how
these restriction prevent “the movement of water to Palestinian communities outside the area”
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In addition, Palestinians living in the Jordan Valley are prevented from accessing the springs
117

because they are outside the lands of the Palestinian communities.

Even though there was an agreement to compensate them, since 1970 the amount of
water allocated to the communities of Bardala, Eid al-Baida, and Kardala has significantly been
118

reduced by Israel.

At first, the residents of Bardala were provided with a million cubic meter
119

per year, however during drought season the demand for water increased.

The residents were

forced to over extract more than the limited supply. With every extra cubic meter extracted,
Israel decreased that amount from the water supply of the following year. This is significant as it
shows the way over time they began to decrease the supply of water to Bardala.
Jamal further explained this by saying “If we extracted one million and two-hundred
thousand cubic meters of water this year, next year they will deduct two hundred thousand from
120

the one million.” Jamal and his brother, Kamal , a resident and a farmer in the village, states
that this is part of the settler colonial strategy to gradually limit the supply of water to the village
and continue diverting excess amounts to the nearby settlements. The water allocated to the
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settlements has enabled them to develop intensive-farming methods and to work the land year
round, with most of the produce being exported.
Wolfe’s widely quoted statement, “settler invasion is a structure and not an event” is
applicable here. Hydro-hegemony and the control over water resources is one aspect of that,
because the end goal is dispossession from land and access to territory. To do so, it engages in an
“inclusive, land-centered project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies” and in this
121

case targets the one most important resource needed for survival.

One of the main ways to do

that is through the interference with the way of life that the villagers have been practicing and
passing down on to generations and most importantly the disruption of
responsibilities” that water supports.

122

the “system of

Water supports every aspect of a community, the people,

the animals, crops, sanitation. etc. Hence, this interference is an example of environmental
123

injustice that disrupts the way of life that a community has been accustomed to . Whyte
connects settler colonialism to ecological violence and environmental injustice, by defining
settler colonialism in this context as:
Complex social processes in which at least one society seeks to move permanently onto
the terrestrial, aquatic, and aerial places lived in by one or more other societies who
already derive economic vitality, cultural flourishing, and political self-determination
from the relationships they have established with the plants, animals, physical entities,
124

and ecosystems of those places.
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In the case of Bardala, this began with the control over the wells and designating them
under Area C which ‘eliminates’ the villagers’ power and agency over their own resources and
creates a sense of reliance on the occupier for the allocation of their most basic need of water.
The dependency on the occupier for “the mere fact that we have to buy our own water from them
[Israel] continues to baffle me, even after all these years” explains Jamal. Yet, this is significant
as it goes back to the logic of the Zionist ideology that was discussed previously. The ideological
justification that the Jewish immigrants have the ability to use the resources better because of
their ‘superiority.’ Nevertheless, this type of justification falls in line not only with the settler
colonial ideology of dispossession but most importantly with the fact that “settler colonialism
destroys to replace.”

125

The case of the wells is a clear example of how settler colonialism is not

just about the physical settlement, or the settler society that is established, but the structured
process of measures taken to reach to the phase of replacement with a desire of expansion of
territory.

Impact on Agriculture
In Bardala where agriculture is the main source of income and more than 95% of the
residents depend on it for their livelihood, the restrictions and the control over water continues to
126

have catastrophic impacts on their daily life.

From the early onset of the Jewish immigration,

establishing settlements in water rich areas was the goal to sustain the settlements127. Hence, the
reason Israel drilled two wells in Bardala was for the purpose of supplying water to the nearby
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settlement of Mehola.

The first settlement to be established in the Jordan Valley was in 1970,

Mehola a moshav, which is a communal, agricultural, and a religious settlement, is located built
south of the Palestinian village Bardala (See Figure 7)
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with 471 settlers residing there.

Majority of the settlements in the Jordan Valley have religious populations; and religious settlers
130

are generally more radical and ideologically committed .

Figure 7: Map of Bardala with the Israeli settlement of Mehola
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The settlement today continues to expand as settlers either build inside the settlement or
construct outposts beside Mehola. An outpost, is an illegal Israeli settlement that was constructed
131

without the approval of the Israeli government . Around Mehola there are two outposts, Shirbat
Hassabim, established in 2016 and Givat Sali’t established in 2002 and is currently awaiting
132

settlement construction . Shadmot Mehola, is another settlement near Mehola which was
133

established in 1979 and has 652 settlers.

Palestinian communities that are surrounded by these

settlements and outposts are under constant threat of “house demolitions, denial of access to
134

water, education and health.”

The outposts are constructed at strategic locations near the

settlements, they are approximately a few miles away from the Mehola and this is a way to
slowly expand their presence in that region by connecting all the outposts to create a larger
‘settler society’ in the near future.
According to an expert on settlement activities in the West Bank “[Israel] they wanted a
block, a settlement, they needed to accumulate a bunch of parcels.” Hence, this expansion of
outposts is part of the strategy of confiscating more land; and keeping in mind the number of
settlers in the two above mentioned settlements, water in these settlements is available 24 hours a
day and the water is allocated from the wells in Bardala. This accumulation of land, as Veracini
(2019) explained can be seen as a form of ‘primitive accumulation’ in which land is appropriated
and accumulated with no reproduction. In the article “Why Israel is Hoarding Water?” Mark
Zeitoun and Muna Dajani (2020) address Israel’s fixated need on controlling and hoarding as
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much water as possible even though they are the least ones who need it . According to Zeitoun
and Dajani “Israel controls more water than Palestinians and the Jordanians combined and more
than double its entitlement when measured against the principles of the 1997 UN Watercourses
Convention” in addition they address the failures of Israel to materialize the 1994 peace treaty on
water with Jordan. In his earlier work on Israel-Palestine water issues, Zeitoun demonstrated
how Israel facilitates hydro-hegemony by constantly exploiting and dominating the water
resources. In this most recent article Zeitoun (2020) acknowledged Israel’s use of “water as an
effective tool of colonialism or even ethnic cleansing.” This is significant and crucial as it
affirms the argument being made in this thesis but also shows how the framework of
hydro-hegemony in the case of Israel-Palestine should also be viewed as part of the settler
colonial framework that is aimed at eliminating the Palestinians.
Various means have been used by Israel to take control of the land in Area C in efforts to
dispossess and exploit the land with a greater goal, the total de facto annexation of the Jordan
136

Valley and the northern Dead Sea to Israel . Some of these methods are done through declaring
these lands state lands, closing land classified as nature reserves, minefields and lands used for
137

military practice . With regards to that, in one interview, a resident from Bardala expressed the
difficulties they faced during the winter of 2020 due to Israel’s declaration of certain lands which
belong to some of the farmers in Bardala as closed military zones. This prohibits Palestinians
from entering and to do so they have a

precautionary sign and other impediments, and

accordingly no one is allowed to enter to cultivate their land. One farmer explained:
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This winter, the situation was very difficult for us farmers because many of our
agricultural equipment and tools were confiscated by Israel when we were working on
our lands. The agricultural fields, which are declared as closed military zones belong to
some of the farmers from Bardala who grow barley and wheat. This resulted in the
confiscation of 5-7 tractors.
The denial of access to these lands can be seen as “accumulation by dispossession ” Veracini
(2019) explains this further saying that this type of accumulation does not amount to physical
dispossession of the indigenous but it is an “appropriation of physical and symbolic public
spaces” In this context, accumulation of water is also applicable, since Israel systematically
denies Palestinians from accessing water. Veracini views the denial of access and settler
colonialism as both primarily focused on the suppression of “place-based” relations”

138

According to a report published by Applied Research Institute (ARIJ) and Jerusalem
Action Against Hunger (ACF), “The Separation Barrier surrounds and crosses through the land
of some villages (Bardala and ‘Ein El Beida), isolating roughly 5,000 dunums on the other side
of the Barrier”

139

Furthermore, they used methods used such as confiscation of lands in the

Jordan Valley that were from Palestinian refugees which was in clear violation of military order,
declaring lands as “state land” and according to B’tselem, “53.4 percent of that area, four time
greater than pre-1967, is not deemed state land.”
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In an interview conducted with an expert on settlement activities in the West Bank he provides
an understanding towards the lack of information regarding the establishment of Mehola.
Accordingly he stated:
The way they established Mehola was by taking people’s private property, confiscating
probably de facto without any official document and we don’t have enough information
about it. But we know the settlement was established by doing a series of what is known
in Arabic as ‘Tabdil’[land exchange]. Mehola, farther north, was established on land
basically taken from dozens of families and we don’t know exactly what belonged to
whom and how it was done. Part of the reason we dont know is because Palestinian
families and communities are not keen to cooperate. The whole issue of ‘Tabdil’ is very
sensitive because what happened is that in many cases people lost their land and the way
it worked was a wave of people fled from the West Bank, and what they [Israeli Civil
Administration] did is that they mapped the absentee land, in return they engaged in land
swaps with the Palestinians.. We don't know exactly how the land had been taken, legally
speaking it was an extremely problematic mechanism which was used.
Farmers in Bardala expressed their frustration with the impediments that the settlements pose on
the village with regards to water. Most importantly, the unequal distribution of water supplied to
the settlement versus to the Palestinians in the communities nearby. Another farmer from the
village, explained that the problem “is not the lack of water, but the unequal distribution of it.”
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The village continues to suffer from water shortage due to Israel’s refusal to increase the amount
supplied. In a report published by Human Rights Watch in 2010, they conducted a fieldwork and

Interview conducted by author.
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research on the Israeli water control in Bardala and according to their interview findings they
revealed that when the settlement tanks were supplied with an adequate amount of water,
142

pumping water to Bardala would stop.

The Palestinian wells used to pump 240 cubic meters of

water per hour, currently the village receives 100 cubic meters of water per hour from Israel

143

.

Another farmer explained how the old water networks were ten centimeters in width,
when Israel took control it cut the pipes in half and connected a pipe that was four centimeters.
This meant that farm lands that were farther away did not receive water due to the low and weak
pressure. Today, the well reservoir pumps 2000 cubic meter of water per hour to the Israeli
settlements, but Mekorot provides 120 cubic meter of water to the Palestinian. He also added that
this reduced the size of the farmland to almost a quarter, since the minimum cubic meters needed
for farmers to irrigate their lands is about 300 cubic meter weekly. Other farmers such as Akram
144

who once used to cultivate 120 dunams

145

of land, today can only use 30 dunams due to lack

of water. He further adds saying:
Before 1980, during the tomato season, trucks of tomatoes used to be exported to Jordan
everyday, in addition to other seasonal produce. We also used to grow melons,
watermelons, eggplants and carrots. Now we barely grow any crops due to the lack of
water. The agricultural farms in Mehola are supplied with high quantities of water right
from our village.
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Adding to that, it is important to note that the agricultural area in the settlements is much
bigger than the built up area of the settlement and they are constructed strategically near water
148

networks.

Moreover, Zeitoun states that “the agriculture sector in Palestine is stifled by the

Israeli occupation of the West Bank and its resource-consuming settlement project therein. The
ratio of Israel–Palestinian agricultural water use is roughly 9:1” This goes back to settler
colonialism where a whole range of various sectors motivate but also contribute to this
enterprise. Thus settler colonialism as we have already established has an unending desire to take
more land, therefore agriculture compliments that

149

.

Wolfe (2006) views agriculture as not only supporting

the other sectors of settler

colonialism but he notes that it is inherently sedentary, to that end it’s permanent. The Zionist
movmenets’ aim from the start was to create the bond between the land and the people and the
best way to do that was through agriculutre, but at the expense of native lands and livelihoods.
This expansion of agriculture not only takes from the territories of the indiginous but Wolfe
(2006) goes on to say that they accumulate and exploit the resources of the natives which results
150

in the curtailing the modes of production for the indigneous people . This has been the case of
many farmers in Bardala and the case of many Palestinian communities who depend on
agirculture for their source of income.
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Only earlier this year, in February 2020, the Israeli Defense Minister Naftali Bennett
151

ordered the ban on Palestinian agricultural exports via Jordan.

This measure came as a result of

the Palestinian Authority’s decisiont to ban on imports of Israeli calves. Yet the measure taken
by Israel will severely impact the national economy of Palestine considering the fact that
according to Jack Khoury and Hagar Shezaf, “in 2019, the Palestinian Authority exported
produce worth 502 million shekels.” This is significant because the majority of the agricultural
produce is from the Jordan Valley and this also adds to the proposed plan of the de facto Israeli
annexation of the Jordan Valley. When I inquired about this, one of the farmers stated “We were
prohibited to export produce to Israel for two months and this had a significant impact on the
farmers because we have a specific season during February and March where specific produce is
exported to Israel, such as zucchini and cucumber. Since we were not allowed to export to Israel
this impacted our ability to sell the produce. This had a detrimental impact on us”
This is another tactic employed by settler colonialism to “dispossess the indigenous
without labor” Veracini (2019) states that “indigenous peoples under settler colonialism are
typically forced onto reservations, not into selling their labor; their labor remains a secondary
con- sideration. “ Hence this is significant here because this can be used as another tool of not
only containment but of also accumulation. Therefore, viewing Israel’s hegemony and
containment over water resources only from a hydro-hegemony perspective undermines the
severity of the conflict. Viewing these actions from a settler colonial perspective provides an
understanding of how overtime Israel’s control over water resources has been done through

Jack Khoury and Hagar Shezaf. February 2020 “Israel bars Palestinians from exporting
produce via Jordan” Haaretz.
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various tactics. These are done as a way to control and accumulate further resources such as land
and water and deprive them from the Palestinians.

Attacks on Water Facilities: An example of militarization of control
The burdensome and intrusive permit regime of the Joint Water Committee has prevented
Palestinians from developing their water facilities and renewing their water pipelines. Prior to
that in 1967, Israel issued Military Order No.158 which requires permits to be obtained for the
construction or rehabilitation of water infrastructure and installation, therefore, lack of permits
152

are subject to confiscation or demolition.

This also gave power to the Israeli military

authorities to control the permit system. In 1995 this was further consolidated through Oslo II
with the establishment of the JWC. In 1996, a year after signing the Oslo Accords, according to
Selby (2013), “Eight USAID-funded production wells submitted in 1996 were not approved until
153

1999”

. Even if approval was granted by the Joint Water Committee, planning approval would

take several years. In many cases permission excluded the renewal of well facilities and
pipelines. In addition, the longest delays in approval were pertaining to wastewater treatment
plans. Gaining approval and an implementation permit is what makes the process tedious and
contributes to the ineffectiveness of the cooperative agreements. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of
the JWC mainly as a result of Israel’s larger political and economic interest, and most
importantly their means to continue restricting Palestinians from experiencing and controlling
154

their own water, constituting a form of what Zeitoun refers to as hydro-apartheid . This has
resulted in Palestinains seeking other alternatives to accessing water.
Koek, p. 34
Selby 2013. p. 13
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Akram explained how residents of the village poke holes on the water pipes to access
more water. He recalled how “Only a few days ago they [Israeli army and Mekorot] stormed our
village, sealed up water holes and cut the water supply that provides the residents with water.”
This constitutes an example of militarization of control, where the Israeli military uses water as a
weapon of control and a tool to dispossess and to dominate.Which is also a way to “punish” the
residents from ‘stealing’ water, but a common response that was shared among the farmers was
that this is not stealing. Akram stated “They claim we are stealing the water, but how can they
call it stealing when this is our water?” and another farmer stated “they don't steal for the mere
purpose of stealing but because they are in need of water. When you have dunams of land, and
you are only supplied with minimum water supply, and there are days where you don't have
water the people start looking for alternatives.” This is done on the grounds of construction
without Israeli permit. The demolition of water facilities and water infrastructure has been
occurring for the past decade. According to a news article published by the Palestinian NGO, the
Applied Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ) in 2007, they reported a demolition in Bardala of a
pool that collects rain water with a capacity of 200 cups. This was done on the pretext that it was
constructed without license and it violates Israeli laws since it is in Area C.
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In a publication released by the Al Haq Organization “Water For One People:
Discriminatory Access and ‘Water Apartheid” in the OPT, the author Elisabeth Koek sheds light
on this hegemony and it shows that not only does it implement a burdensome permit regime but
“the Israeli military authorities regularly target water collection systems for confiscation and

Research Institute Jerusalem (ARIJ). 2007. “The Ethnic Cleansing Campaign of the
Jordan Valley Intensifies”
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destruction, including those provided by humanitarian organisations .” To further maintain
their hegemony and control, Israel has actively practiced the systematic denial of permits for the
rehabilitation of water networks and infrastructure in the West Bank. Palestinians are required to
obtain a permit from the Israeli Civil Administration, however, this does not apply to Israeli
settlers. The institutionalized policies and practices are part of a system that has been aimed at
maintaining domination and oppression of the Palestinians as a group. It perpetuated a system
intended to segregate populations along racial lines. Therefore constituting a system of ‘water
apartheid.’

157

This is seen in the practices, management, and the policies imposed on how

Palestinians access water.
The demolition of livelihood related structures as a result of lack of Israeli issued permits
has caused the displacement of hundreds of Palestinians. Specifically in Area C, the majority of
those who have been displaced were impacted by the destruction of water structures, connections
and wells. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHAoPT), “Between July 2018 and March 2019, the
Israeli authorities shut down about a dozen unlicensed water openings serving farmers in
158

Bardala, gravely affecting their livelihoods. ” Due to water scarcity and the limited access to
water, Palestinians in the northern Jordan Valley who once used to cultivate around 15,000
dunums of land are now only able to cultivate about 8,000 dunumus. Constituting almost a 50
per cent decrease from the past years. Furthermore, OCHA notes that according to the Tubas
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governorate Israeli settlers in that area are allocated eight times more than the water that is
allocated to the Palestinians per hour. The militiaztion of control and the destruction of water
strucutres amounts to a clear case of ‘water apartheid.’ Koek provides the three pillars that the
159

institualized policies rests upon which result in ‘water apaartheid’ that are as follows :
Israel has exerted considerable military and political efforts (1) to gain, maintain and
consolidate exclusive access to Palestinian water resources, (2) to appropriate water
resources for the sole benefit of Israelis, including settlers, and (3) to paralyse Palestinian
water infrastructure development in the OPT, aimed at forcibly transferring Palestinian
communities.
This type of institutionalized settler colonial policies are aimed to dispossess the
Palestinians to ultimately annex the land and its natural resources. The system of domination that
Israel has been practicing on the Palestinians since 1967 has only been further consolidated with
any efforts made to revisit the allocation of water resources.

Sumud: Steadfastness of Palestinians in Relation to Water
While there is not much literature discussing sumud o r even resistance in relation to
water, this section will briefly build towards that with an aim of creating a discourse on
Palestinians’ modes of resistance towards control over water. Yet, in this context water and land
are interrelated as one cannot exist without the other. Looking at the way settler colonialism
disrupts ecological structures and the livelihoods of the Palestinians, specifically in relation to
water, it is important to explore the ways in which the local population attempts in redistributing
159

Koek 2013. P. 90
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the control and power. This section provides an analysis of the modes of resistance Palestinians
in Bardala use to counter Israeli control over the water resources and their denial of access to
water and land. It further seeks to show how the structure of power shifts from ‘power over’ the
hegemonized and the colonised to ‘power' to’ the hegemonized and colonised. This is helpful in
looking at power relations not just at a state level but also at the local level.
The “distinct anti-colonial responses” that Veracini (2011) discusses can be characterized
160

as sumud, in the case of the Palestinian, which is an Arabic word which is translated to
‘steadfastness.’ “Existence is Resistance” an often used phrase that describes the Palestinians
who continue to practice sumud, and their willingness to defy the daily struggles of the
occupation. During the first Intifada, the uprising, in 1987, the word sumud became one of the
161

symbolic words of the Palestinian national movement.

Selby (2003) notes that it represented

the Palestinians’ “willful refusal to submit to [Israeli occupation] or be humiliated by it.”
Therefore they were determined to establish an autonomy that to “get by, in spite of it.”
Often times the Palestinian resistance movement is perceived as the young men who
throw stones, but sumud is getting past the daily struggles that Palestinians face. Veracini (2011)
also adds that various modes or strategies of resistance can be combined for the colonised to
162

respond. He notes that colonised people “develop distinct anti-colonial responses.”

In the

interviews I conducted in Bardala, when I was discussing sumud in relation to water, an often
repeated response was finding adjustments to counter the occupation as an act of sumud. O
 ne of
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the respondents stated: “W
 e have to continue to find alternatives to live, the Jordan Valley is
known for its scorching heat, we cannot survive here without water. We as farmers need water
for our agriculture, so we find alternatives to remain steadfast.”
Some other alternatives that the residents of the village have been using to adjust to the
abnormality of the occupation were discussed by the interviewees. A year ago, some of the
residents of Bardala dug a well to collect water without obtaining the necessary permit. Any
construction or development of water infrastructure in Area C needs prior approval from the
Israeli Civil Administration, since that is impossible to obtain, the residents proceeded to dig the
well. However, this was met with defiance from the Israeli army who demolished the well and
filled it with cement. According to James Scott (1987) this type of alternative is characterized as
163

everyday forms of resistance or civil disobedience . He views the peasantry as less likely to
confront the authorities so instead they seek other forms of resistance. Furthermore and an
important argument that Scott (1989) makes is that everyday forms of resistance does not
164

constitute a form of collective action . He views them as individual acts of “self help” that do
not require the high level of coordination and organization as the other forms of resistance
movements do. Looking at the case of Bardala, the residents' everyday forms of resistance can be
seen when the residents poke holes in the water networks that connect to the nearby settlements.
and create vents so they can access water. The residents explained to me that this has been one
of the most common forms of resisting and it is an alternative to their current situation. This
resistance however is countered by Israel who automatically seals the vents and issues a fine that
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Scott, James, 1989. “Everyday forms of Resistance” The Copenhagen Journal of Asian
Studies. Volume 4.
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ranges from 4,000 NIS to 7,000 NIS which is equivalent to 1,000-2,000 US dollars. In addition
to that, Israel constructed a new water network where the pipes were dug into the mountains,
then passed through the neighboring village of Kardala and on to nearby Israeli settlements,
165

pumping the town’s supply of water . While they are currently testing the new water network,
the farmers are anticipating more water cuts, and less water supply to Bardala and the
neighboring villages.
Nevertheless, when the aim is for the indigenous people to leave, then their persistence
and survival is what’s important. This is the case here, Israel’s aim is to gradually dispossess
and forcibly transfer the Palestinians, but Palestinians continue to remain steadfast and merely
exist. Hence stems the phrase “existence is resistance.” According to the findings of Joseph
Ivanka Wessel, who explored counter-hegemonic tactics in two different border communities,
the occupied Golan Heights and the West Bethlehem Villages in Area C of the occupied
Palestinian Territories she revealed that “the occupied counter the occupier’s discourse
constantly by their mere existence and provision of alternative narratives built on historical and
current, observable facts”166
Veracini emphasizes this stating “it is resistance and survival that make certain that
167

colonialism and settler colonialism are never ultimately triumphant.”

Palestinians for the past

decades have been engaging in various modes of resistance as a way to show their resilience but
also to survive as a group. This is where it is important to point out the distinction Veracini
(2011) describes with regards to the different ways colonised people and colonised people react

with a farmer conducted by the author.
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in the face of colonisation. While the latter may choose to leave on the ground of denying labour,
the former may choose to “stay put, fulfill customary obligations, and survive as a distinct
group” they also engage in unequal labor. These actions within themselves constitute acts of
sumud. Sumud as a mode of resistance does not rely on coercion or public opposition. On the
contrary it involves “practical ingenuity and improvisation.”

168

It is a mental state that rejects the

statu quo and the governance structure. According to Selby (2003) what also makes it different
169

is that it does not involve collective solidarity but the local and individual actions .
Sumud

in relation to water can be seen in the various ways where Palestinians,

specifically farmers engage in to access water. Such as water theft where farmers disconnect the
water meters at night to irrigate their lands, digging to extract ground water, and poking holes in
the water pipes. While some of these activities can be seen as “illegal and sub-legal activities”
they do so in order to survive and get by in the face of Israel’s evergrowing control over the
water resources and continued water cuts to Palestinian villages and cities. Characterizing them
as water theft though undermines the Palestinian right to access their own historic water. As we
saw earlier from an earlier account of a farmer that he does not consider this as theft, or stealing
because historically the water has been theirs. Selby on the other hand views this as a form of
170

resistance to global governance and in this case it’s resistance to the water supply regime.

Them engaging in acts of sumud can be seen as a form of regaining agency over their
resources and having a sense of control over water even though they are aware of the
consequences. It is also a matter of finding alternative sources of water and this could be done in
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various ways, such as different ways of collecting it, or storing in underground cisterns. Finding
adjustments to the daily struggle of accessing water was also a common theme that Philippe
Bourbeau and Caitlin Ryan (2018) revealed in their study.
Some of the farmers explained to me how they collect rainwater in underground cisterns
so they can use it during emergency situations. One of them noted saying “It fills up to 60 cubic
meters of water and even though cleaning the collected water is a tedious process we need to
have a back up for days where we don’t have water, especially in the summer.” Upon my visit
to their house, I observed how they fill up soda bottles with water when Israel supplies them with
water. That is their way of making use of every drop of water, to ensure that they have enough.
Selby thus views sumud as not only “a mode of resistance but also a mode of governance albeit
one that is thoroughly out of sync with the international consensus on good governance in the
field of water.” This is due to the fact that Palestinians have been able to manage their own water
supply through alternative practices, and rationing of their needs. Their capacity to adapt and
create new ways they can access water. Adapting however, should not be looked as Palestinians
normalizing the occupation.
Another form of sumud w
 hich Palestinians engage in is simply their steadfastness and
resilience to stay put on the land and not leave. While the goal of Israel’s settler colonial
enterprise is to dispossess, Karim’s form of steadfastness is to continue farming and simply not
leaving, this was a common mode of resistance among the interviewees. Karim said “One thing
I know for sure, is leaving this land is not an option. We are staying here.” Palestinians choosing
to remain on their lands is a symbolic vehicle of resistance. This type of resistance can be
classified as place-based opposition where the indigenous people have a physical or symbolic
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relation to the place where a specific identity can be tied too.

171

Their fight against settler

colonization is seen in their rootedness and connection to their land. Because they know once
they leave their lands, there is no return. Even though some residents of the village did leave for
nearby urban cities, Akram said “Where would I go? My entire family lives here. We have a
history in this land and a right to access our water."
Both Akram and Karim’s families have been one of the indigenous families in Bardala
who have been living there for generations. According to Wessel (2015) “the strong local
attachment to cultural heritage and identity forms a strong basis for counter- hegemony and
172

human agency against military occupation and colonisation. ” Accordingly, the modes of
resistance that are used between those who are under the domination of hydro-hegemony and
those who are under settler colonial rule to counter water control, can be similar in terms of
strategies and tactics.
However, indigenous people, like the Palestinians, that are facing settler colonialism,
practice resistance because their struggle with domination is not just about accessing water, it is
due to the fact that water is being used as a tool to facilitate their dispossession and elimination.
Hence, Palestinians engage in everyday forms of resistance to maintain their presence on their
lands and to continue adjusting to the daily impediments faced by the Israeli occupation.
Therefore, while the Israeli-Palestine water issue is comprehensively explained under the
Framework of Hydro-Hegemony, such important factors are not fully examined. Exploring it as
such, paves the way for understanding the impacts of hydro-hegemony from the experiences of
those on the ground, specifically people whose power and rights are limited. In addition to
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understanding how resistance to water control under settler colonialism can be practiced. One of
the farmers expressed his frustration with their situation and stated “We want the people to know
what we are experiencing, and the struggles we have to endure as farmers without water. A
village that is on the borders, and with a Separation Wall. The living situation continues to
exacerbate, agricultural equipment continues to be confiscated and continue to run out of water”
Hence, having to get by and get around the water regime is an act of steadfastness and resistance
to settler colonial policies.
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Conclusion
Through this thesis I have explored the ongoing Israeli control over Palestinian water
resources in the northern Jordan Valley village of Bardala using a settler colonial framework.
The current literature examines this conflict using a hydro-hegemony framework and it
illuminates crucial factors that contribute to hegemony and domination. Even though that is
significant and highlights important elements that shape the power dynamics it does not provide
a full understanding of the issue. Therefore a literature review was provided of comprehensive
analysis on the framework of Hydro Hegemony, which has been used to explain water control,
and water domination by riparians through a power relation understanding, and settler
colonialism. While there are overlaps in the tactics and strategies that are used by
hydro-hegemon and settler colonial states, they do however have different goals. While the
former seeks consolidated control over the water resources, the latter uses water as a tool to
achieve its political goal of eliminating the native.
This shows how Israel has been using water as a tool to dispossess, evict, and eliminate
the Palestinians from their lands. The slow creep of settler colonialism and its control over water
resources was evident in the stages prior to the creation of the State of Israel. Since 1967, when
Israel laid control over the water resources in the West Bank, it has been systematically
depriving Palestinians of their equitable share of water. Nevertheless, the Oslo Interim
Agreement further consolidated this by its asymmetric power relations. Bardala is a village that
is dependent on agriculture for it’s income and since 1967, they have been struggling to access
water following Israel’s control over their wells. The permit regime, attack on water facilities,
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and control of water resources are all part of the greater settler colonial policies used against
Palestinians.
A conceptual framework was also developed to understand modes of resistance to
domination and hegemony. It was evident that there is little research on counter-hegemony and
this is an area that needs to be further explored. Therefore, using a settler colonial framework
helped in providing an understanding on how Palestinians in the village cope with the ever
changing control over the water resources. Yet these modes of resistance should not be seen as
normalcy to the occupation, these are methods used to maintain their presence on their lands.
Therefore, I examined Palestinian resistance to water control through everyday forms of
resistance and by remaining steadfast or practicing sumud. T
 o conclude, this research provided a
comprehensive analysis of how settler colonial framework can be helpful in studying water
issues beyond the power dynamic relations on the riparian position and to understand how power
at the local level is channeled back through various forms of resistance to colonial powers. The
importance of studying this issue from a settler colonial perspective helps illuminate the greater
goal that Israel is pursuing and that is the total de facto annexation of the Jordan Valley and the
West Bank and the dispossession of Palestinians. Hence, it is crucial to not only examine FHH
when studying the Israeli-Palestinian water issues but to go beyond that.
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